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Abstract




Whether or not the much demonised ‘postmodern’ readings of Nietzsche ever did hold much weight in philosophical Nietzsche study, such readings are now broadly discredited. Rather than going over old territory, in the following I will take for granted that Nietzsche is in the business of revealing a more truthful account of a wide range of modern phenomena. My concern is not whether Nietzsche tries to convey truth, but how he does so. In other words, the question I wish to answer is: if it is the case that Nietzsche aims to give us more truthful accounts, what kind of accounts does he give and in what sense could they be more truthful?
A popular answer to this question has been that Nietzsche’s accounts are causal accounts that emulate a natural scientific method. This way of reading Nietzsche, which I will call the ‘causal reading’, maintains that Nietzsche aims to give truthful accounts of the causes of, primarily, moral phenomena (what causes pangs of conscience, guilt, pity, etc?). My contention is that this reading is mistaken with regards to both Nietzsche’s methodology – what Nietzsche considers an acceptable form of explanation – and his method – how his own explanations work. The good news for those of us who maintain that Nietzsche is concerned with truth is that there is a more accurate way of reading his method and his methodology that does not lapse back into the ‘postmodern’ reading (or at least how that reading has been portrayed). In what follows I will show why the causal reading is mistaken, and outline an alternative non-causal reading of Nietzsche’s method. 




The causal reading is the culmination of developments over the last 25 years in readings of Nietzsche that emphasise his naturalism.​[1]​ The causal reading includes two primary claims: the first about Nietzsche’s explanatory method; the second about Nietzsche’s methodology of causal accounts. Christopher Janaway gives us a succinct formulation of the first claim:

Nietzsche is a naturalist to the extent that he is committed to a species of theorizing that explains X by locating Y and Z as its causes, where Y  and Z’s being the causes of X is not falsified by our best science (Janaway, 2007: p.37)​[2]​

One of the obstacles we face when assessing this reading is that even Janaway’s more precise formulation of the first claim falls short of stipulating exactly what counts as a causal explanation, and thus precisely what causal readers claim about Nietzsche’s method. Nonetheless this obstacle will be circumnavigated in subsequent sections because, as should be clear later, my argument against this first claim applies regardless of which kind of causal explanation the causal reader wants to attribute to Nietzsche. In other words, the claim that Nietzsche’s explanatory method is causal will be shown to be false regardless of the details of that claim. 
The second claim in the causal reading concerns Nietzsche’s methodology: Nietzsche’s explicit treatment of causal explanations shows him to consider such explanations legitimate. But this second claim faces a problem: Nietzsche is in fact often explicitly critical of the use of causal accounts (the detail of Nietzsche’s criticisms will be covered in the next section). This problem has not gone unnoticed by proponents of the causal reading. Their solutions have varied, but share two claims: first, that Nietzsche’s objections to the use of causal concepts amount to a causal scepticism, or reasons to doubt the truth of explanations that employ such concepts; and second, that this causal scepticism is limited to a certain kind of causal explanation and does not extend to others. Together these claims can be used to defend the causal reading, and to defend Nietzsche’s methodological consistency, because it leaves open the possibility that Nietzsche objects to one form of causal explanation while using a different form.​[3]​
Much ink has already been spilt on whether we should agree that Nietzsche’s causal scepticism is limited.​[4]​ Thankfully – and as I hope to show in the next section – we needn’t settle these debates in order to show that the causal reading misunderstands the scope of Nietzsche’s critique of causal explanation. A more comprehensive account of his analysis of causal concepts will reveal that some of his objections are not concerned with the truth of causal explanations. The objections that I will identify extend beyond the limits of his causal scepticism – to include not just folk-psychological and metaphysical explanations but also natural scientific causal explanations – on the grounds that such explanations betray objectionable motivations. This means that regardless of the limits of Nietzsche’s causal scepticism, he has reasons to be suspicious even of those causal explanations that are not vulnerable to his causal scepticism. Both those who have defended the causal reading of his methodology, and those who have criticised the causal reading, have hitherto missed this.

II
I’ll begin my reading of Nietzsche’s objections to causal explanations with the least ambitious of those objections. At times Nietzsche dismisses only those causal accounts that rely on a simple understanding of the causal efficacy of the will. These are, according to Nietzsche, accounts that would be offered by ‘thoughtless’ people (GS 127) about their own actions: I have acted in the way that I have because that action has been caused by my will. Nietzsche’s objections to such an account are multiple, and also vary in degree of strength and scope: those who believe this simple account of action assume without question that they understand what the will is and what it means for the will to be the cause of action (GS 127); they wrongly assume that the will is simple (BGE 19); they wrongly assume that we can identify the cause of an action by looking for an associated act of will or conscious motive (TI VI 3); and they wrongly assume that the will is causally related to action at all (‘There are no mental causes whatsoever!’ TI VI 3). In these instances Nietzsche objects that the folk-psychological account is insufficiently reflective – leading to reductive assumptions about a simple causal relation between our actions and a mysterious entity called ‘will’ – and that it includes straightforward mistakes, including the mistaken belief that will is causally related to action.
The objections that follow from what Maudemarie Clark has called Nietzsche’s falsification thesis are wider in scope. Not all Nietzsche’s statements of the falsification thesis identify the concept of causality specifically as responsible for our errors.​[5]​ There are nonetheless statements of the falsification thesis that name the concept of causality as a source of error. These statements range from Nietzsche’s worry about the use of causal concepts in ‘explanation’ rather than for ‘designation and agreement [der Bezeichnung, der Verständigung]’​[6]​ (BGE 21; cf. GS 112) to the stronger claim that the use of causal concepts will inevitably lead to error.​[7]​ In short, the objection to causal accounts that follows from the falsification thesis is that such accounts must rely on our experience of causally-related phenomenal objects, which means that causal accounts are just as error-prone as any other accounts that involve beliefs or claims inferred from our experience of the world. 
Arguments in the literature about the causal reading have focussed on these sceptical concerns. But whether and how Nietzsche’s objections are restricted in scope is not only a matter of the scope of his causal scepticism, because not all of Nietzsche’s objections concern the truth of causal accounts.​[8]​ Nietzsche raises a further objection to the use of causal concepts that does not reject causal explanations on the grounds that we have reason to doubt their veracity. Whether Nietzsche holds to the falsification thesis, and whether he thinks any or all causal accounts could be false, is irrelevant to this objection. 
The objection emerges in Nietzsche’s psychological analysis of what he calls an ‘instinct to causality’ (‘Instinkts des Ursächlichkeit’, KGW VII 34[53]; ‘Causalitäts-Instinkt’, KGW VII 34[89]), a phrase that Nietzsche most often uses to refer to our inclination to search for causes. It is important to bear in mind that Nietzsche’s target here is not the use of a causal explanation per se. Rather, Nietzsche’s target is an inclination that he associates with causal explanation in modern psychology and natural science.​[9]​ The instinct to causality refers to our tendency to react to natural events by assuming that the event has been caused by something else, and that the proper response to that event, if we want to understand it, is to identify its cause. Nietzsche’s analysis of this inclination is psychological, as indicated by his references to causal instincts and habits (‘Dies ist unsere älteste Gewohnheit’ KGW VIII 2[83]), insofar as it raises questions about the motivations of those who are thus inclined. The treatment of causal concepts found in the relevant passages would thus be better described as a psychological analysis than as a philosophical analysis; a study of what psychological need is served by assuming that a change in the world has an identifiable cause, rather than an investigation to determine whether this assumption leads us to true belief.
The instinct to causality can be developed, according to Nietzsche, through repeated exposure to either folk-psychological approaches to understanding human behaviour or animistic approaches to understanding natural change (GS 127; TI FGE 3; GM I 13). Some variants of folk-psychology tell us that actions are the effect of a will, such that actions can be better understood by looking for the will that has caused them. Some variants of animism tell us that all natural change has been willed by a divine agent, such that natural events can be better understood by looking for the divine will that has caused them. These approaches encourage a habit of looking for a cause when something in the world changes. Nietzsche maintains that, having spent millennia strengthening this habit to the point of dogma, we are acting on this same habit when we respond to change by looking for a natural cause. The only difference, according to Nietzsche, is that we have replaced agents, divine or human, with natural causes.​[10]​
Nietzsche claims that folk-psychological and animistic causal explanations have served two psychological needs. The first is the need to alleviate the distress that some of us feel when faced with something unfamiliar (‘Unfamiliar things bring danger, unrest, anxiety [Mit dem Unbekannten ist die Gefahr, die Unruhe, die Sorge gegeben] – the primary instinct is to get rid of these painful states’, TI VI 5; cf BGE 192). This need is largely served by animistic explanations, which project what (we think) we already know about ourselves – our actions are caused by our will – onto actions that are not our own. Nietzsche also suggests that this need is sometimes served by natural causal explanations, which translate the doer-deed model into natural causal terms (TI VI 5, KGW VII 35[35]). He thinks of these instances of the instinct to causality as narcissitic projections onto strange events. When I understand the world in terms that are appropriate to me and my actions, the world appears less alien and more comfortable.
The second psychological need is served by both folk-psychological and animistic causal explanations. This is the need to hold something to account for a painful experience. When a friend is in a car accident, when a family member falls ill, when a career falters, when a relationship breaks down, we search for a reason why this has happened. As Nietzsche puts it, ‘pain always asks for a cause’ (GS 13; cf. GM III 15, TI IX 34). Nietzsche explains our tendency to search for a cause of pain as an expression of ressentiment, Nietzsche’s term of art for frustration felt at the inability to alleviate one’s own suffering. This is seen most clearly, according to Nietzsche, when we identify an agent as the cause of our suffering; when I interpret pain as an action willed by an agent, that agent can be blamed (see GM I 13, TI VI 7). With a guilty party identified, I can cope better with ressentiment by either venting my frustration through punishment, or through the boost to my self-esteem achieved by distinguishing my moral worth from that of the evil wrongdoer. In other cases of causal explanation, particularly religious explanations, we cope better with suffering by finding a purpose or reason for that suffering (see GM III 28). If I cannot escape my pain, the next best thing is to locate that pain in a cosmic order that gives it some significance greater than the bare fact of suffering.
The instinct to causality, according to Nietzsche, is developed in the course of our attempts to alleviate distress and suffering. But why would Nietzsche consider this an objection to that instinct? The instinct to causality is developed by those who are trying to cope with either distress in the face of the unfamiliar, or frustration in the face of suffering, or both. It is, in this regard, part of the psychology of someone who is trying to cope with suffering. But it is also part of the psychology of someone who is taking what Nietzsche would consider an ignoble approach to coping with suffering, insofar as that approach betrays a weakness of character in the person who is looking for a cause. If we find comfort in narcissism – projecting what we think we know about our will onto the natural world – we do so because we cannot bear the idea that the world may be alien to us. If we find comfort in holding someone to account for our suffering, or in locating our suffering in the context of a greater order, we do so because we cannot bear meaningless suffering. In both of these cases we betray weakness of character because we show that we cannot bear something that, at least in Nietzsche’s view, is an inevitable feature of the human condition. Nietzsche thinks, then, that the instinct to causality is a psychological feature of someone who cannot cope with pain in an honourable way.
Thus Nietzsche’s psychology of causal explanation gives him reason both to suspect that those who practice causal explanation do so because of their instinct to causality, and to object to that instinct on the grounds that it demonstrates the weakness of character in the person looking for a cause. For my purposes, the most important feature of Nietzsche’s account of the instinct to causality is that it is not only found in the folk-psychological and religious accounts through which that instinct develops. Nietzsche also thinks this same instinct can be found in natural scientific causal explanations (GS 127, GM I 13, TI VI 3).
We might object that Nietzsche’s analysis of the instinct to causality gives him no reason to think there is something wrong with natural causal explanations. As folk-psychological and religious accounts serve psychological needs that natural causal accounts do not (how do I punish, for instance, a naturally occurring disease?), Nietzsche cannot object to the latter on the grounds that they are expressions of ressentiment. 
However, Nietzsche’s claim is not that natural causal explanations are used to cope with suffering, but rather that we look for natural causes because we have a habit of looking for causes in general, and that this habit of looking for causes reveals the fact that we cannot bear our suffering in a more noble fashion. The instinct to causality, according to Nietzsche, is a habit developed through numerous attempts to alleviate suffering. This means that when this habit is particularly deeply rooted it may influence our explanations even in cases in which the explanandum is not an explicitly painful experience, or in cases where the explanation looks unlikely to help us cope with pain. After years of looking for something to blame for my ill-health, I may find myself looking for the causes of neutral phenomena simply through habit. 
Similarly, Nietzsche suggests that such habits can develop culturally. A scientific community, for instance, can develop a tendency to accept only causal explanations because the majority of its members, or perhaps even only its most influential members, have developed their own habit to alleviate suffering through the search for causes. This means that Nietzsche’s suspicion can extend even to individuals who are not themselves looking to alleviate their own suffering, because those individuals may have adopted the practices of others who are more explicitly driven by the instinct to causality.
Note, however, that though Nietzsche’s suspicion of causal explanations is much broader than the causal reading has maintained, it still has its limits. On my reading, Nietzsche need not disregard all causal explanations. Those explanations that demonstrably do not express the instinct to causality are not excluded by Nietzsche, provided they also avoid his sceptical objections. Note also that Nietzsche does not dismiss outright the legitimacy of causal concepts. Thus Nietzsche can both be suspicious of causal explanations and accuse others of confusing cause and effect (TI VI 1), without inconsistency or hypocrisy, because the latter is not an attempt to explain something by identifying its cause (I will return to this issue in the final section). Nietzsche could even accept that causes and effects exist without undermining his concern about the instinct to causality. 




If I am right about Nietzsche’s objections to causal explanations, then the causal reading of his methodology cannot be right. It remains to be seen, however, why we should reject the causal reading of Nietzsche’s method. It is possible that Nietzsche employed a form of explanation that did not meet his own methodological standards, and that he both looked on causal explanations with suspicion and nonetheless used them himself. Hence I need to do a lot more in order to show that Nietzsche’s own explanatory method is not causal. 
Before I offer my reading of Nietzsche’s method, and show how that method is non-causal, I want to state clearly the extent of my ambitions. First, my aim is not to show that each of Nietzsche’s explanations conform to the method I attribute to him. In this respect my claim about Nietzsche’s method is not unlike those of the causal reading, which has claimed only that Nietzsche’s characteristic explanatory style emulates the natural sciences as on the most part it adopts causal explanatory methods. Similarly, my claim about Nietzsche’s method is not a claim about each of his explanations, but instead about what we should expect of a Nietzsche passage when he is trying to tell us something.
Second, I will restrict my claims to Nietzsche’s psychological explanations. To those who wish to emphasise Nietzsche’s naturalism, this may seem to render my claims too weak. Perhaps the causal reader of Nietzsche will concede that in the case of Nietzsche’s psychological accounts his explanatory method is not causal, but maintain that this only applies to a minority – albeit a sizeable minority – of Nietzsche’s analyses.​[11]​ But this would be to underemphasise the significance of psychology in Nietzsche’s work. The fact that Nietzsche was a self-styled psychologist has received a fair amount of attention in recent literature (e.g. Pippin, 2010; Katsafanas, 2013), which has made efforts to take seriously Nietzsche’s suggestion that we might see psychology as queen of the sciences (BGE 23). Nietzsche himself suggested at times that psychology might be the ‘path to the fundamental problems’ (ibid), a suggestion that bears out in an approach to philosophical issues that has at times been called ad hominem (Solomon, 2004): responding to philosophical and scientific claims by asking what kind of person would make such claims, rather than whether the claims themselves are valid. In accordance with the significance Nietzsche himself attributed to psychology, I submit that my thesis, restricted as it is to Nietzsche’s psychological method, is nonetheless a significant thesis about Nietzsche.
With these qualifications in place, we can turn to the way Nietzsche’s explanations take a non-causal approach. To draw out the features of Nietzsche’s method that occur repeatedly in his psychological accounts, it will help to begin with his simpler explanations. The most basic structure of Nietzsche’s psychological writing is to be found in those passages that offer insight into the psychology of a particular individual, as opposed to passages in which Nietzsche offers psychological insight into social, cultural, and historical phenomena that are not restricted to a particular person. In such passages Nietzsche exhibits his so-called ad hominem approach. Thus Nietzsche will suggest that the categorical imperative revealed Kant’s instinctual opposition to life (A 11), that Socrates’ dialectics were an expression of his ‘plebeian ressentiment’ (TI II 7), and that Paul betrayed his vanity in his proto-Calvinist doctrine of predetermined damnation and redemption from sin (WS 85).
More often Nietzsche’s psychological accounts do not focus on a particular person, but on a character-type. Nietzsche tells us that an egoist, for example, often does not pursue the satisfactions of his ego, but instead an impersonal ‘fog of habits and opinions’ that are developed by others, thus revealing that his behaviour is more in the service of the opinions of others than his own (D 105). Better known examples of Nietzsche’s analysis of a character-type include those of the ascetic (particularly in GM III), the scholar (BGE 6), the ‘dogmatist’ (BGE P), and the actor (GS 361). These passages offer insight into the behaviour that we associate with a particular form of life, or way of understanding and valuing the world. In much the same way that the passages focussing on particular individuals reveal something about the character expressed by the actions of those individuals, the passages dealing with forms of life reveal something about the character expressed in the actions, judgements, and evaluations that we associate with that form of life. What we see in both the particular and broader applications of Nietzsche’s psychology is an attempt to read our behaviour as indicative of a particular psychological type, an attempt that often also challenges the way we ordinarily think about such behaviour. 
The approach to understanding evident in such passages is partly explicated in BGE 6, where Nietzsche suggests that philosophy is ‘a type of involuntary and unself-conscious memoir’, and that ‘to explain how the strangest metaphysical claims of a philosopher really come about, it is always good (and wise) to begin by asking: what morality is it (is he – ) getting at?’ (see also BGE 187). Here Nietzsche’s concern is with how we understand philosophers in particular, but his statement of a wise approach to doing so reflects the same approach he takes in passages that concern the other characters that populate his work. Nietzsche’s approach is guided by the heuristic principle that every human action, including the expression of a belief in writing or in speech, will reveal something about the character of that person, and that we may and indeed often will reveal our character through our actions without intending to do so. This heuristic principle should, Nietzsche suggests, prompt us to respond to the behaviour of others by asking what morality is revealed by their behaviour, where ‘morality’ refers to the values that constitute the character in question. This is, I submit, precisely the question that Nietzsche is attempting to answer in his psychological accounts of Kant, Socrates, philosophers, scholars, and ascetics.
Such examples demonstrate Nietzsche’s principle that it is possible to better know the character of a person through analysis of the ‘morality’ revealed in their behaviour. But for Nietzsche psychological explanation is a two-way street; as behaviour can reveal a better understanding of the person, so too can the person reveal a better understanding of her behaviour. Many of Nietzsche’s explanations situate instances of behaviour in the context of a broader, more comprehensive biographical account of the person who has behaved as such. Nietzsche’s psychological explanations thus interpret a person’s actions in light of one or more of a range of her relevant biographical details: personal history, habits, the nature of her relations with friends or family, perhaps even her social, political, or cultural context. This kind of explanation contributes greater understanding about a particular act by reinterpreting that act to arrive at a more accurate understanding of precisely what the act is. Consider for instance, D 111:

To the admirers of objectivity. - He who as a child was aware of the existence of manifold and strong feelings, but of little subtle judgment and pleasure in intellectual justice, in the relatives and acquaintances among whom he grew up, and who thus used up the best of his energy and time in the imitation of feelings: he will as an adult remark in himself that every new thing, every new person, at once arouses in him liking or dislike or envy or contempt; under the pressure of this experience, towards which he feels himself powerless, he admires neutrality of sentiment, or 'objectivity', as a matter of genius or of the rarest morality, and refuses to believe that this too is only the child of habit and discipline.

Nietzsche’s primary explanandum here is, I take it, the admiration that some feel toward the self-control of others. There are a number of features of such ‘admirers of objectivity’ that Nietzsche invokes in order to explain that admiration: the admirers he has in mind were likely to have grown up attempting to imitate the ‘manifold and strong feelings’ of surrounding family and friends; they developed an intense emotional responsiveness, finding themselves as adults unable to control their strong responses to new things; and they refuse to believe that the self-control that they admire in others is just as habitual as their lack of self-control. How are these details supposed to help further our understanding of the admiration of objectivity? Note that no claims are made about a causal relation between any of the biographical or psychological features of the admirer. For Nietzsche it is significant that the admirer of objectivity may have developed his habit in a particular context, not because that developmental context is causally related to the current behaviour, but simply because the life of the admirer will help us understand what kind of person he is, and what kind of person he is will help us understand what he is doing now. Nietzsche’s suggestion is that if the admirer of objectivity is someone who has grown up imitating the emotional intensities of those around him, it is likely that this same admirer should be understood as characteristically impulsive and distinguished by a lack of objectivity. Moreover Nietzsche is suggesting that this insight into the character of the admirer should raise questions about precisely what it is he admires in the neutrality of others. Perhaps this should be understood not so much as the admiration of objectivity as the reverence, perhaps even envy, of the power that other people can exercise over themselves.




One of the ostensible virtues of the causal reading is that it defends Nietzsche against a charge of hypocrisy by reconciling his explanatory method with his methodological critique of causal explanation. But I have argued that the causal reading is mistaken. The question remains, then, whether Nietzsche is guilty of practising that against which his methodology preaches. In this section I argue that even though Nietzsche’s suspicion of causal explanations extends to naturalised accounts, his own explanatory method escapes this suspicion because it is not a causal explanatory method. The goal of this section, then, is to show that Nietzsche’s explanations are non-causal.
What distinguishes Nietzsche’s explanations from causal explanations? The primary difference between the two forms of explanation is that they answer different questions: a causal explanation will always help us answer the question ‘how did X come to exist?’, whereas a holistic explanation will always help us answer the question ‘what is X?’ If I am asked to explain a certain geographical phenomenon (for example, a tarn) I might legitimately respond by giving an account of its genesis (tarns are formed when cirque glaciers erode soft rock on a mountain and melt into the hollow). This is a causal explanation. If I am asked to explain the gestures of a cricket umpire, it is likely that I’ll only achieve this by accounting for those gestures in the context of the rules of cricket in general and by situating those particular gestures in the context of this particular game of cricket. This is a holistic explanation.
This has ramifications for the ways in which the two different forms of explanation can be used to correct our understanding. As a causal explanation gives us an account of how something came to be, it can correct our understanding of the genesis of that thing. Thus, for example, a causal explanation of mental illness might be used to correct our understanding of the genesis of psychopathy, though it does not necessarily change the way we think of psychopathic symptoms. By contrast, a holistic explanation gives us an account of what something is, and accordingly can correct our understanding only if it can show us that we have been wrong about the nature of the explanandum itself. Thus a holistic explanation of the behaviour of a particular psychopath, in order to have any critical purchase, must show us that hitherto we have not properly understood that person’s behaviour. We might do this, for instance, by showing that a particular psychopath is someone who has a tendency to seek the validation from others, and thereby suggest that what we previously thought of as arrogant self-aggrandizing is actually an expression of profound insecurity and the need to be recognised. Thus the holistic explanation, if successful, changes the way we think of the symptoms, rather than their causes.
One further difference between the two modes of explanation lies in the truth standards applicable to both. A causal explanation must always make a true claim about the origin of its explanandum in order for the explanation to be true. A holistic explanation need not; my explanation of the behaviour of the cricket umpire can be true without any true claims about the cause of that behaviour. (This has important consequences for the way we think about Nietzsche’s genealogical explanations, to which I will turn in the final section.)
This does not mean that those who explain holistically cannot also make claims about causes. The two forms of explanation are not mutually exclusive, and I can consistently explain the same phenomenon in both ways. A cricket umpire’s raised finger has a causal genesis and a role to play in a game of cricket, and accordingly I can learn more about his behaviour from both a causal and holistic approach. Moreover sometimes a causal explanation can aid a holistic explanation, and vice versa: knowing how a tarn is formed helps us understand what a tarn is​[12]​; if I learn the role that cricket bails play in a game of cricket, I am more likely to correctly identify a collision with a cricket ball as the cause of their fall from the stumps. 
The two kinds of explanation can also use the same explanans, though they will differ in the way the explanans is used to further our understanding of the explanandum. Both causal explanations and holistic explanations can appeal, for instance, to biographical information. In the case of causal explanation, when we appeal to biographical information we do so in order to identify that which is responsible for bringing about some present phenomenon (e.g. ‘Ted Bundy’s psychopathy was caused by his grandfather’s violent temper’). In doing so, we address the question ‘why did this happen?’ In the case of Nietzsche’s holistic approach, we appeal to biographical information in order to reveal that the present phenomenon is different to what we first thought (e.g. ‘Given who he is, Socrates’ dialectics are better understood as a flight from the world than as a search for truth’). In doing so, we address the question ‘what has happened?’ 
Causal and holistic explanations are thus often complementary. This is, I maintain, consistent with my claim that Nietzsche’s explanatory method is holistic and non-causal. In order to defend Nietzsche against the charge of hypocrisy (that Nietzsche’s methodological suspicion is directed to a form of explanation that he employs in his own work) I need only show that Nietzsche’s explanatory method can be non-causal, and hence can be practised without being vulnerable to his methodological suspicion of causal explanations, not that his explanatory method must be non-causal. 
But have I shown even this? One might object that a holistic explanation, thus described, depends on a causal explanation insofar as it must first identify the cause of behaviour before proceeding with a holistic account of the behaviour. Our reason for thinking this would be that a holistic approach needs some way of distinguishing relevant from non-relevant explanatory information (why is the childhood development of the admirer of objectivity in D111 important for understanding him? should we also think that his height is relevant? if not, why not?), and that the most obvious way to do this is to identify the factors that have caused our behaviour. Accordingly, we might say, in order to show us what a person is doing, Nietzsche must first address what caused that person’s action. This would mean that Nietzsche’s holistic approach is just an expanded variant of causal explanation.
There are however examples of holistic explanations in general, and examples of holistic explanations employed by Nietzsche, which do not and need not first identify a cause. Holistic explanations will sometimes explain through appeal to contextual factors that cannot be understood as causes of the explanandum, because the explanans and explanandum cannot relate to one another causally. Say that we explain the behaviour of a cricket umpire by giving an account of the significance of his gestures within the rules of the game. In this case, the rules of the game explain his gestures, but do not cause those gestures. The same can be said of some holistic explanations that appeal only to biographical factors. We might, for instance, explain my colleague’s repeated absence from work on Wednesday afternoons with the fact that she has a weekly therapy session. Her weekly appointments don’t cause her absences, but they do help us understand what she is doing when she leaves the office by situating these events within a broader understanding of their biographical context. 
Nietzsche’s accounts often take this form. The fettered spirit’s belief that the free spirit is wrong is explained by the fact that the fettered spirit takes utility to be a measure of truth (HAH 227). The fact that Richard Wagner’s overture is a late-modern German work explains its lack of beauty, grace, and logic (BGE 240). Kant’s success among his peers is explained by the protestant culture in which he published (A 10). The recurrence in the history of philosophy of the claim that God is causa sui is explained by philosophers’ belief that anything of value cannot develop from something else (TI, ‘‘Reason’ in Philosophy’, 4). In such cases, Nietzsche’s explanans and explanandum do not relate to one another as cause to effect. These cases are thus examples of Nietzsche explanations that are holistic without being causal.
Perhaps the examples given above could be reworded to adjust the ontological status of the components of the explanations in order to translate these explanations into causal explanations. We might say, for instance, that Nietzsche’s point about Kant is that the latter’s success is explained by the disposition of those around him to respond favourably to transcendental idealism. In this sense, Nietzsche identifies a cause (the disposition of Kant’s contemporaries) of the favourable reception of Kant’s work.  
However, some holistic explanations employ explanans that cannot be the cause of the explanandum because the former occur after the latter. In such cases, rewording will not grant us a causal explanation. Often when we realise, for instance, that we have fallen in love, we recognise our earlier behaviour as expressions of latent affection and desire. In such cases we realise a significance of the things that we earlier said to or did with a person that we did not realise at the time, and we arrive at this understanding of our earlier behaviour through recognising something about our present emotions. The explanatory information in such a case is not distinguished by the fact that it is the cause of the explanandum. Nietzsche too offers retrospective accounts when he suggests, for instance, that the significance of Socrates’ dialectics may only be fully appreciated once we hear his dying words ‘I owe Asclepius the Saviour a rooster’, which prompt extended reflection on Socrates attitude to life in Twilight of the Idols (TI, ‘The Problem of Socrates’, 1).​[13]​ In such cases the explanans are not causes of the explanandum.
It remains to be seen what alternative standards these holistic explanations employ to distinguish relevant from non-relevant contextual factors. Dealing with this sufficiently would take me beyond the scope of this paper. All I need establish here is that, even though holistic explanation does need a way of distinguishing explanatory relevant information, it need not appeal to causes to do this.




I began section III by restricting the scope of my claim about Nietzsche’s explanatory method. I have not maintained that each of Nietzsche’s explanations is holistic and non-causal. I have, rather, argued that Nietzsche’s method is on the most part holistic and non-causal, such that when we approach a Nietzsche passage that is explanatory we should expect it to reflect the holistic method. This means that my reading would not necessarily be undermined were we to find an example of an explanation offered by Nietzsche that does not follow this method. Nonetheless, if were we to gather together a critical mass of counterexamples in Nietzsche’s work, my reading would be on shaky ground. To reinforce that ground, I will conclude by addressing some apparent counterexamples to my reading.
First, consider again the psychological account of the instinct to causality explicated in detail above. We might think that this account poses a problem for my reading of Nietzsche’s explanatory method. The problem is that Nietzsche’s psychological explanation of the instinct to causality can be plausibly cast as a causal explanation: we believe that particular phenomena are caused; that belief is caused by our instinct to causality; that instinct to causality developed from an older human tendency to search for causes; that tendency was caused by our ancestors’ fear of the unknown and habit of looking for something to hold responsible; and that habit to hold something responsible is caused by weakness of character. It appears that Nietzsche’s psychology of causal explanation is itself a causal explanation.
However, Nietzsche’s account can also be plausibly cast as a holistic explanation.  We could recount it as follows: we often respond to a natural event by looking for its cause, and we think that we do this because we are trying to establish the truth; when we do this, we infer from (what we think we know about) the relation between will and its effects that there is a cause of the natural event; we are also people who feel anxiety and fear in the face of the unknown, and accordingly tend to alleviate that fear by reinterpreting the unknown in terms familiar to us; moreover, we are people who have a habit of looking for something to hold responsible for our pain; given who we are and the habits involved in our understanding of natural causation, we have good reason to suspect that our tendency to look for causes is not an attempt to establish the truth but in fact an attempt to either alleviate anxiety, or hold something responsible for our suffering, or both. 
How are we to choose between the two ways of reading Nietzsche’s psychological account of causal explanations? I see no reason to find the causal reading more plausible than the holistic reading, unless we already work with the assumption that Nietzsche’s method is on the most part a causal explanatory method. I suggest that we have seen enough in the preceding considerations of Nietzsche’s methods and methodology to at least suspend this assumption. Moreover, we have two reasons to prefer the holistic reading. First, the holistic reading reconciles Nietzsche’s method and his methodology in this case. Given that Nietzsche’s suspicion of the use causal explanation is not limited in scope (as shown in section II), it would undermine a causal reading of Nietzsche’s account of the instinct to causality. This is not so with a holistic reading. Second, the causal reading leaves Nietzsche’s psychology of the instinct to causality open to the charge of genetic fallacy (invalidly inferring the value of a causal explanation from the value of its origin). On the holistic reading, Nietzsche does not commit a genetic fallacy because he does not infer anything about causal explanations from their origin.
This same genetic fallacy charge is sometimes brought against Nietzsche’s historical accounts. Accounts such as those included in On the Genealogy of Morality appear less easily defended against the charge because they seem less easily read as non-causal. And aside from the genetic fallacy problem, Nietzsche’s historical accounts could pose an additional problem for my reading because they appear to be causal explanations, thus counterexamples to my claims about Nietzsche’s holistic method. 
But contrary to appearances Nietzsche’s historical accounts are not instances of causal explanation. I explained earlier that one of the differences between holistic and causal explanations is that the latter must make a true causal claim in order to be true. This means that a causal explanation is necessarily falsified if we realise that its account of the origin of the explanandum is false. The same cannot be said for Nietzsche’s historical accounts. We would be missing the point of, for instance, Nietzsche’s account of the origins of conscience in GM II if we objected that his history is factually inaccurate (e.g. if we showed that it was not the case that historical debt institutions offered compensation to debtors in the form of violence). The truth of Nietzsche’s histories, unlike that of causal explanations, does not stand or fall on whether his account of the origins of contemporary moral phenomena is factual.
We might think this raises a further problem: if Nietzsche’s explanations include false origins claims then they include errors about their explanandum, and thereby fail to explain. But this problem arises only if Nietzsche’s historical accounts include claims about the facts of the origins of contemporary phenomena. On the causal reading, these accounts must do so. Therefore the only way the causal reading can accommodate the fact that Nietzsche’s genealogies are not falsified by contrary historical fact is by admitting that Nietzsche’s genealogies fail to be explanations. By contrast the holistic reading can take a more optimistic view of Nietzsche’s historical accounts, because on this reading Nietzsche’s histories make claims about how to best understand the contemporary phenomena, not claims about the causal genesis of those phenomena. My reading could, for instance, read Nietzsche’s histories as origin myths that, while intentionally fictional regarding causal genesis, are nonetheless designed to reveal something true about our moralising behaviour.​[14]​ On this reading, Nietzsche’s historical accounts are not erroneous because they do not propagate false (or indeed any) historical beliefs, but rather attempt to show us something true about contemporary moral phenomena.
Nietzsche’s historical explanations, then, needn’t be read as making causal claims. There are, however, a number of passages in which Nietzsche does make causal claims. One such example is his treatment of Alvise Cornaro’s diet in TI VI 1. Here Nietzsche contends that Cornaro has mistaken the effect of his constitutional longevity – a meagre diet – for its cause. In the course of his critique of Cornaro, Nietzsche claims that ‘the preconditions for a long life…were in fact the cause of his meagre diet’. Another example of Nietzsche’s causal claims can be found in GM III, where he claims that the urge to anesthetise pain is ‘the actual physiological causation of ressentiment’ (GM III 15). In GM III Nietzsche even goes so far as to raise explicitly causal questions (‘What causes this sickliness?’ GM III 13). Similar examples can be found in a number of passages in The Twilight of the Idols (VI 2, 4, 5, IX 19, 20, 33, 40) and Antichrist (7, 15, 23, 49).
More often than not, passages in which Nietzsche appeals to causal concepts do not undermine my reading because they do not use a cause as explanans. I observed earlier that the Cornaro passage does not contradict my claim about Nietzsche’s methodology because it does not undermine his suspicion of using causal explanations. The same can be said for my claim about Nietzsche’s method; though Nietzsche implies in this passage that there are facts of the matter regarding the causal relation between Cornaro’s longevity and his diet, this passage is not a causal explanation because Nietzsche does not here explain Cornaro’s mistake by identifying the causal origin of that mistake. Equally, Nietzsche tells us in TI VI 5 that ‘the ‘why?’ should, if at all possible, not give us the cause as such, but rather a particular kind of cause’ [Das „Warum?“ soll, wenn irgend möglich, nicht sowohl die Ursache um ihrer selber willen geben, als vielmehr eine Art von Ursache]. Though Nietzsche implies here that there is such a thing as a ‘cause as such’, he is not offering an explanation of the instinct to causality by appealing to that ‘cause as such’. Such passages are accounts of the mistakes that other people make when explaining causally that imply that Nietzsche thinks there are factual causal relations, but they are not examples of Nietzsche explaining something through appeal to its cause.
There are nonetheless some passages in which Nietzsche asks and answers the kinds of questions that are distinctive of a causal explanation (GM III 13, 15). Such passages are indeed examples of causal explanations in Nietzsche’s work, though as I have maintained throughout, a small number of counterexamples does not contradict my claim about Nietzsche’s explanatory method. These examples do, however, give us occasion to make two observations about Nietzsche’s thought on causal explanation. First, while on the most part Nietzsche’s work escapes his suspicion of causal explanations, there are instances in which he may be open to the same criticisms he makes against expression of the instinct to causality. There are a small number of such cases, but these cases are important evidence that Nietzsche is not beyond the reach of his own concerns about the psychology of modern science. Second, these examples may give us pause to reconsider the universal scope of a principle of charity when reading Nietzsche. The fact that Nietzsche is not beyond the reach of his own methodological suspicions raises important questions about the extent to which Nietzsche is susceptible to the influences of those contemporary practices he found objectionable. Perhaps, then, it would be better not to protect Nietzsche against a charge of hypocrisy at all times, but instead to see these examples as evidence in favour of Nietzsche’s worries about the widespread influence of the instinct to causality. If Nietzsche himself exhibits an instinct to explain away his pain, then his suspicion of causal explanation may be more warranted than even he realised.
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^1	  See, for example: Clark (1990), Clark and Dudrick (2004), Janaway (2007), Kail (2009), Leiter (2002), Richardson (1996).
^2	  There is for Janaway much more to the rhetorical strategy of work like On the Genealogy of Morality than identifying what has caused morality. Nonetheless, Janaway still shares with others in this field the insistence that Nietzsche’s way of giving us a more truthful account of, for instance, moral phenomena, is to identify the causes of those phenomena. 
^3	  It will be worth noting some examples of this. Brian Leiter has attributed a narrow scope to Nietzsche’s objections to causality by claiming that Nietzsche is sceptical only about the truth of causal accounts that support religious and moral beliefs (Leiter, 2013). Drawing on Nietzsche’s claim that Christianity and morality operate with ‘imaginary causes’ (A 15), Leiter maintains that Nietzsche distinguishes between those imaginary causes and ‘real’ causes, the former referring to causes allegedly invoked in religious or moral explanations, and the latter referring to causes identified by natural science. The scepticism of Leiter’s Nietzsche thus stops short of raising doubts about causal accounts verified by natural science. Similarly, Peter Kail (2009) maintains that Nietzsche is only sceptical about explanations that aspire to metaphysical claims. This limited scepticism concerning causation, according to Kail, does not exclude nomological causal claims or claims about the causal genesis of a singular event. Maudemarie Clark’s account of Nietzsche’s causal scepticism has had two stages. The first was a result of her attempts to deal with a broader problem for her reading: Nietzsche’s apparent ‘falsification thesis’ (Clark, 1990: passim), a neo-Kantian representationalist error theory according to which claims inferred from empirical evidence are inherently false. Clark’s answer to this concern has been to argue that in his  mature work Nietzsche no longer thinks claims about reality inferred from experience – including claims about causal relations – are necessarily false. In more recent work Clark and Dudrick have argued that Nietzsche thinks that causal laws are legitimate if understood only to be factual descriptions of regular and predictable contiguous concurrence of phenomenal events (2012: p.91).
^4	  For debate about whether Nietzsche does in fact endorse the falsification thesis, see Clark and Dudrick, 2004; Hussain, 2004; Han-Pile, 2009. For debate about whether Leiter is right to limit the scope of Nietzsche’s causal scepticism, see Acampora, 2006; Leiter, 2013; Rowe, 2013.
^5	  Some versions of the thesis cite space, time, and number as error-prone concepts (HAH 19). Nietzsche’s later concerns about falsification blame our ‘Reason’, which falsifies the ‘testimony of the senses’ to make the world appear as if it is constituted by discrete objects and by substances that persist permanently (TI ‘’Reason in philosophy’ 2 and 5). Some versions of Nietzsche’s falsification worries name no particular concepts and instead propose blanket scepticism about the truth of anything of which we are conscious (GS 354; cf. GS 265, BGE 11).
^6	  I have indicated where I have departed from the translation cited in the reference list by including the original text alongside.
^7	  See e.g. WL: ‘Only that which we bring to [objects] – time, space, and hence succession and number – are really known to us’ [Nur das, was wir hinzubringen, die Zeit, der Raum, also Successionsverhältnisse und Zahlen sind uns wirklich daran bekannt].
^8	  Indeed we might think that if Nietzsche’s concerns with causal accounts were exclusively sceptical, then he may not have reason to object to causal accounts at all. As Nietzsche tells us in BGE 4: ‘Falseness of a judgement is for us not an objection to a judgement [Die Falschheit eines Urtheils ist uns noch kein Einwand gegen ein Urtheil]’.
^9	  ‘The natural scientists [Die Naturforscher] do no better when they say ‘force moves, force causes’ and such like, - all our science [unsere ganze Wissenschaft], in spite of its coolness and freedom from emotion, is still under the seduction of language [unter der Verführung der Sprache] and has not rid itself of the changelings foisted upon it, the ‘subjects’’ (GM I 13).
^10	  GS 127: ‘since man believed for immense periods of time only in persons…the faith in cause and effect has become for him the fundamental faith that he uses everywhere something happens – still today instinctively and as an atavism of the oldest origin’; TI VI 3: ‘The oldest and most enduring psychology was at work here, doing absolutely nothing but this: it considered all events to be deeds, all deeds to be the result of a will, the world became a multitude of doers, a doer (‘subject’) pushed its way under all events’. See also KGW VII 34[53], KGW VIII 1[37], 1[38], 2[83].
^11	  Clark and Dudrick have already said as much in recent work (2012; chapter 5).
^12	  Note that the causal explanation does not exhaust our understanding of a tarn. For example, I understand a tarn better when I learn ecosystems common to tarns. In this sense, understanding the ecological context of a body of water can aid our understanding of it. 
^13	  A similar point about retrospective revelations has been made in expressivist readings of Nietzsche’s moral psychology (see for instance Owen, 2009; Ridley, 2009; Pippin, 2004, 2010). 
^14	  Thus joining a history of origin myths (Rousseau, Hobbes, arguably Genesis) that, while largely fictional, are intended to reveal something true. For more on the truth-telling capacity of a fictional genealogy, see Williams, 2002.
